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It is widely proven that individuals that consume more alcohol are also much more likely to suf-
fer from a working accident. However, this observed correlation may be due to other unobserved 
factors affecting both alcohol consumption and working accidents (such as the type of job). Thus, 
in this paper we establish the causal impact of alcohol consumption on working accidents by 
exploiting a reduction in Spanish bar opening hours that was introduced progressively through-
out regions and time. We first show that the policy effectively reduced working accidents. Al-
though there may be many channels by which bar closing hours affect working accidents, we 
provide evidence that alcohol consumption, which stands as one of these potential channels, is 
also reduced after the introduction of the policy. Our paper is the first one to provide evidence 
that stricter closing times for bars causally reduce accidents at work. This is important from a 
policy point of view as working accidents stand as a very important determinant of productivity 




1. Introduction  
In this paper we analyze the causal effect of a policy that reduced bar opening hours in Spain on 
workplace accidents. Furthermore, we also study the impact of this policy on several proxies of 
alcohol consumption: household expenditure in bars, self-assessed alcohol consumption as well 
as hospitalizations due to excessive alcohol consumption. Our results show that reducing bar 
opening hours causes a decrease in both working accidents as well as alcohol consumption. Thus, 
we provide the first evidence on the existence of spill over effects of restricting the timing of 
alcohol sales on the probability of suffering from a working accident. We also show that these 
effects are heterogeneous across gender and economic sectors.  
This analysis is important for several reasons: first, workplace accidents entail massive economic 
and social costs, affecting not only individuals involved in the accident but also the society as a 
whole. According to Takala et al. (2014) in 2012, 2.3 million individuals died worldwide due to 
workplace related accidents. For the different countries, this implied an average economic cost 
between 1.8% and 6% of their GDP. Second, we focus on a country, Spain, which stands at a 
relatively negative position with respect to its European neighbours regarding workplace safety. 
Tejedor (2006) examines differences in workplace accidents among EU15 countries for the years 
1996 and 2003 and concludes that, in almost all outcomes, Spain was at the back tail of 
workplace safety standards. For instance, during the period analyzed Spain was the country with 
the largest number of workplace accidents that required three or more days of sick leave in order 
to recover. Regarding mortal workplace accidents, Spain was behind the average in the EU15 
and almost tripled the number of accidents in which at least one person dies with respect to 
countries such as Sweden or the UK. Finally, even if there is a large body of literature that 
reports a strong positive correlation between alcohol consumption and workplace accidents (Van 
Charante et al. 1990, Zwerling et al. 1996, Wells 1999 amongst others) causality has not yet been 
established.  
Our identification strategy is based on a policy that reduced bar opening hours from 6am to 2-
3.30am in Spain. This represents a strong reduction on the number of hours that bars can remain 
open and, thus, may have affected the probability of suffering a working accident. There are 
many channels through which limiting the number of opening hours for bars can result in 
reductions in workplace accidents. For example, one argument is that individuals will stop 
drinking alcohol before which will improve concentration the next day at work. However, there 
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could be also alternative explanations that do not entail a reduction in alcohol consumption. For 
example, individuals could drink the same amount than before (although in a shorter period of 
time) but, because they go to sleep earlier and get more hours of rest, they could also be in better 
shape the next day and, thus, avoid having accidents while working. Another argument can be 
that, even if the amount of alcohol or the number of hours of sleep do not change, if individuals 
spent at home the time that they would have spent in the bar, then they may potentially be less 
tired which, in turn, can reduce the probability of suffering a working accident the next day. 
Additionally, it could even be the case that individuals that do not go to bars are less disturbed by 
noise at nights and are less exposed to fatigue and, thus, they may be in better shape to work and 
to avoid a workplace accident. Therefore, it is not feasible for us to identify all the channels 
potentially operating and in this paper we focus on the effects of the reform on one other 
outcome (and potentially mediator) which is alcohol consumption. 
Thus, we exploit the staggered implementation of the reduction in bar opening hours across 
regions in Spain in order to identify any causal effect of the policy on working accidents, the 
expenditure of individuals in bars, self-assessed alcohol consumption and hospitalizations related 
to alcohol consumption. To be best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that reports a drop in 
the probability of suffering from a working accident when bars are no longer allowed to remain 
open until sunrise. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature that demonstrates how changes on the timing of 
alcohol sales reduce the consumption of alcohol by affected individuals (Wicki et al. 2011, 
Carpenter et al. 2009, Marcus et al. 2015, amongst others). Some of these papers also explore 
potential spill over effects of these policies such as impaired driver road crashes and driver 
breath alcohol (Chikritzhs et al. 2006), emergency ward admissions and suspected drunk driving 
(Ragnarsdottir et al. 2002), fatal traffic accidents (Lovenheim et al. 2011), total accidents, 
pedestrian accidents, single-vehicle accidents and multi-vehicle accidents (Raymond 1969), 
traffic crash injuries (Smith 1990), crime rates (Heaton 2012) and workplace absenteeism (Green 
et al. 2015). We contribute to this literature and provide evidence of another positive spill over 
effect (a reduction in workplace accidents) of policies that affect alcohol consumption. One 
important difference of our paper is that we focus on a restriction in bar opening hours while 
most of the previous literature considers policies that increase opening hours of alcohol selling 
establishments. Green et. al (2015) examine the effects of the same policy and find a reduction 
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on the probability that a worker is absent from work as a result of the restriction in bar opening 
hours. We go one step further than the paper by Green et al. (2015) and focus on an outcome that 
has much stronger negative effects in terms of health and disability. Furthermore, we use 
population level data on everyone who suffered from a working accident, which allows us to get 
a much finer identification than survey data and we also report the impacts of the policy on 
alcohol consumption, which was unexplored in Green et al. (2015).  
 
2. Spanish Context  
Spain is divided into 17 regions (Autonomous Communities). Each of these regions implemented 
the reduction in bar opening hours at some point between 1994 and 2011. Before the reform, bars 
in Spain were allowed to open until 6am. This was reduced to 2am-3.30am, depending on the 
region. The progression of these changes through time and regions can be observed in Table 1 
and Figure 1 in the appendix
1
. Both the Table as well as the Figure show the exact timing of the 
introduction of the reduction in bar opening hours in each region. We can see that the reforms 
were very staggered over time so that there are no two regions implementing the change at the 
same time. Thus, in our identification strategy we will make use of this heterogeneous 
implementation of the reform in order to build a quasi-natural experiment comparing regions that 
have already implemented the policy against those that have not yet introduced it. 
One obvious question that may be asked at this point is the reasons that each region had when 
taking the decision to implement the reduction in bar opening hours at a specific point in time. In 
order to understand why different reforms were implemented in such a wide time range it is 
important to be familiarized with the Spanish political structure. The 17 regional entities in Spain 
represent first-level political and administrative divisions. Therefore, these different regions can 
exercise their right to self-government (limited by the constitution and their regional statutes) 
and can decide on when to implement these types of reforms. It is important to point out that 
other related policies affecting bars and alcohol consumption (changes in taxation, etc.) can only 
be implemented at a national level. That is, apart from bar opening hours, other changes 
implemented in the considered time period were introduced homogenously in all regions at the 
same time and, therefore, will not impose a threat to our identification strategy (as they will be 
                                               
1
 Table 1 has been extracted from Green et al. (2015). We have slightly modified their original table by adding the 




captured by the time fixed effects). 
The principal objective of the implementation of these reforms was to reduce problems of social 
coexistence derived from the activity of bars. These problems referred to the noise, pollution and 
dirt that agglomerations of individuals generate. This is a notable difference with respect to 
similar policies studied in the literature (changes in the timing of alcohol sales) which main 
objective is the reduction in alcohol consumption.
2
 Thus, because the reduction in alcohol 
consumption was not the prime objective of the reduction in bar opening hours in Spain, we 
expect the potential endogeneity of the policy to be minimized. That is, our guess is that the 
timing of the implementation of the policy in each region will not be correlated to previous 
trends in alcohol consumption in that particular region. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the 
policy was not systematically introduced by a concrete political party with a certain ideology. 
Table 2 in the appendix shows the regional political party at the moment of the implementation 
of the policy in each region. As it can be seen, there were 6 different political parties in the 
regional government at the time that the policy was implemented; 8 of them can be considered as 
left wing parties while 9 of them can be considered as right wing parties. In any case, in the next 
section we will provide some additional evidence of the exogeneity of the policy in our setting.  
In order for the policy to be effective, at least two conditions need to be fulfilled: first, bar 
activity in the country has to be important so that a large number of individuals are potential 
affected. This condition is fulfilled in the case of Spain as the number of bars per inhabitant is 
very high with respect to other countries. According to Sans (2016) in 2016 Spain had around 
260.000 bars. This corresponds to one bar for every 176 Spaniards and places Spain as the 
country with the highest number of bars per capita in the world.  
Second, restrictions in bar opening hours should be imposed at a time range in which individuals 
are, in effect, spending time in bars so that forcing bars to close earlier would, indeed, affect the 
behaviour of Spanish citizens. This condition is also fulfilled as Spaniards nightlife extends until 
early in the following morning. For instance according to a report of the Drug Addiction 
Foundation (FAD) published in 2016, in 2004 66.3% of young individuals reported leaving bars 
after 3am. Therefore, this suggests that these late night life hours are common in Spain and that 
restricting bar opening hours until 2.30am or 3.30am affected a time range that was highly used 
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The regional reforms are described in different regional laws (decrees). The justification of this restrictive law 








We make use of six different data sources in order to identify our effects of interest. The first one 
is register data from the Spanish Social Security administration which includes all individuals 
that experienced a working accident in Spain at some point between 1990 and 2011. The large 
time span of the data allows us to include at least 4 years before and 4 years after the 
implementation of the policy in 16 of the 17 regions in Spain. The only exception is Catalonia 
that introduced the policy in 2011. The database contains information on all workplace accidents
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that occurred in Spain for each of these years and has a total of 273.828 observations
4
. The 
database also includes information on the economic sector of the injured worker (industrial, 
construction or services sector
5
), the gender of the worker as well as the trimester of the accident. 
Thus, we collapse the individual data at the level of year, trimester and region following 
Oreopoulos et al. (2012) so that we transform the repeated cross sectional data into a panel of 
working accidents in each region over time. As the number of employed individuals changes 
over time and across regions, we divide the data by the number of employed individuals in each 
region and time (employment data derived from Spanish National Institute of Statistics, INE). 
This allows us to generate a rate of workplace accidents per region and trimester-year that we 
will use as our dependent variable. Additionally we make use of data on the unemployment rate 
throughout region and time (again trimester and year) in order to control for local business cycle 
conditions (unemployment data derived from Spanish National Institute of Statistics, INE). 
In order to identify the effects of the restriction in bar opening hours on alcohol consumption we 
make use of three different databases. First, we use survey data from the Spanish Family 
Expenditure Survey (EPF) for the years 1998 to 2004 (17.763 observations) in order to assess the 
impact of the reform on expenditure in bars. This survey provides annual information on the 
nature and destination of consumer spending, as well as on various characteristics related to the 
                                               
3 Total workplace accidents include severe, very severe and mortal accidents. The number of mortal accidents is too 
small so as to do a separate analysis including only mortal accidents. 
4 It has to be noted that we do not have a personal identifier so that the database is not a panel but a repeated cross-
section. 
5 Regarding the Agricultural sector, it is important to stress that for some regions there are very few observations. 
Thus, we exclude the Agricultural sector from the analysis. 
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living conditions of households. Amongst other information, the survey includes a variable that 
captures yearly expenditure in bars, which we will use to evaluate the impact of the reform on 
alcohol consumption. We also use information on yearly expenditure in durable goods in order to 
perform a placebo test experiment (as expenditure in durable goods should not be affected by 
changes in bar closing hours).  
Second, we also explore the effects of the restriction in bar opening hours on alcohol 
consumption using data from the Spanish National Health Survey (ENS). The ENS is a survey 
that is periodically carried out in Spain by the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality 
(MSSSI) and contains information on self-reported health status, life habits and health coverage. 
We focus on the information regarding self-reported alcohol consumption, which is divided into 
different types of alcoholic drinks. The ENS is not done on a yearly basis which makes it more 
complicated to capture the impacts of the policy in a precise way. We pool the data for the years 
1995, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007 which include a total of 83.734 observations. 
Finally, we use data on hospitalizations caused by alcohol consumption as a proxy variable for 
extreme alcohol consumption. This is repeated cross sectional data from the National Institute of 
Statistics that includes the universe of hospitalizations caused by alcohol consumption that 
occurred in Spain between 1990 and 2011.
6
 The following diagnostics are included: Mental 
health disorder and dependency syndrome caused by alcohol consumption, liver diseases caused 
by alcohol consumption and alcohol poisoning. We consider only individuals aged between 16 
and 65 ages old which include a total of 870.061 observations. The database also includes 
information on gender. Although we are aware that hospitalizations represent an extreme 
outcome derived from highly abusive alcohol consumption episodes, we think it is interesting to 
explore the existence of any effects on that variable as the reduction in bar opening hours was 
relatively large (from 6am to 2am) and can potentially have an impact on this extreme margin. 
Additionally, if the policy fostered reductions in alcohol-related hospitalizations, then the 
impacts of the reduction in bar opening hours on health outcomes will potentially be very long-
lasting. We follow a similar strategy than before and collapse the individual data at the level of 
year, trimester and region. We next divide it by the population aged 16-65 living in each region 
in each period of time in order to construct a hospitalization rate that will be used as a dependent 
                                               
6  95.5% of all Spanish hospitals are included in the database which implies a coverage of 99,5% of all 




variable. Some descriptive statistics of these databases are presented in Table 3.  
3.2. Identification strategy 
We employ a difference-in-differences (DD) framework, exploiting differences in the timing of 
adoption of the policy across Spanish regions in order to identify the effects of the reduction in 
bar opening hours on workplace accidents. We use the same model to estimate the effects of the 
reform on workplace accidents as well as on the three measures of alcohol consumption:  
 
                                                             
                                                                        (1) 
 
In this specification     stands for workplace accidents for every 100.000 employed individuals 
as well as for hospitalizations caused by alcohol consumption for every 100.000 individuals. 
This information varies across regions, r, and over time, t, which is captured in trimester-years. 
When we analyze household expenditure on bars and other durable goods, we use as dependent 
variable the mean of expenditure (in logs) for each region and time whereas for the self-reported 
variables on alcohol consumption (from the health survey) the dependent variables are dummies 
for daily/weekly/monthly consumption of wine, whisky, etc.  
Our variable of interest in regression 1 above is Treat. This is a step function taking value one 
after the policy is adopted and zero before. As the policy is introduced in different trimesters and 
years in different regions (see Table 1 below), the Treat variable turns 1 at different calendar 
times in each region although all of them correspond to the period in which the policy is imple-
mented in that particular region. Additionally, year, trimester and region fixed effects are in-
cluded to control for seasonal and region specific differences in alcohol consumption and work-
place accidents as well as for any trends over time affecting the entire Spanish territory. Apart 
from the nation-wide trends over time in alcohol consumption and workplace accidents, there 
could also be region specific trends that could be interfering in our identification strategy. Thus, 
in order to control for these regional trends and be able to credibly isolate the effects of the re-
duction in bar closing times we also include in (most of) the regressions linear region-specific 
trends. These are calculated by interacting the dummy variables for each region with a linear 
time trend. The time trend equals 1-4 for the different trimesters of the first year, 5-8 for the dif-
ferent trimesters of the second year and so forth. Although there is a risk that the linear region 
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specific trends will capture part of the effect of our policy of interest, we think it is important to 
include them in order to correctly isolate the effects of the policy from other unrelated trends at 
the regional level. Apart from that, we also include an additional time varying control at the re-
gional level, the unemployment rate, in order to capture labour market conditions at the local 
level. We present the results for several sub-groups of the population, such as gender and sector 
of economic activity, in an attempt to identify the group most affected by the policy change. We 
estimate the regression weighting observations by either the total population in each region and 
time (for alcohol consumption) or the employed population in each region and time (for work-
place accidents).  
As mentioned above, in this particular setting we believe endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem 
as the policy was introduced to reduce problems of social coexistence (noise, pollution) that may 
not be directly linked to high alcohol consumption patterns but more to cultural attitudes. How-
ever, we perform several tests in order to provide some evidence of the exogeneity of the timing 
of implementation of the policy. First, we plot the means of the two main outcome variables 
(workplace accidents and household expenditure on bars) before and after the implementation of 
the policy. Second, and similar to the graphical representation of the pre-treatment trends, we 
estimate an event study model in which we include in the regression three additional dummy 
variables that capture the trend of the outcome variable one, two and three years before the im-




We first focus on the results that analyze the impact of the reduction in bar opening hours on 
workplace accidents which are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The tables have two panels: Panel A 
presents the main results of the difference-in-difference model while Panel B includes the event 
study design. Regressions in both panels are estimated for everyone as well as separate 
regressions are performed for women, men, workers in the industrial, construction and service 
sectors. Table 4 presents the results of the model without linear region specific trends and we can 
see that the coefficients that capture the impact of the policy on workplace accidents for 
employed individuals are all negative. Furthermore, the effect is significant for both men and 
women as well as individuals working in the service sector. When we focus on the total 
population, we can see that the reduction in bar closing hours decreased the number of working 
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accidents in 2.62 per 100.000 employed individuals. When we compare the size of the effect 
with the mean of working accidents in the sample (which is 28.03 for the total population) we 
can see that the policy caused a reduction in workplace accidents by 9%. For woman, the policy 
reduced working accidents by 15% and for man by 7%. For the services sector the reduction in 
working accidents amounted to 11%. It is also important to note that, although it is not 
significant, the size of the coefficient is very large and negative for the construction sector.  
Panel B reports the results of the event study design and we can see that there is no evidence of 
differential trends in the outcome variable one, two or three years before the implementation of 
the policy. In order to provide some additional graphical evidence on the exogeneity of the policy 
implementation with respect to our two main outcomes (working accidents and household 
expenditure in bars) in figures 2 and 3 we examine the trends for these two variables before and 
after the regions introduced the policy. We can see that both outcomes follow a relatively stable 
path before the policy is introduced but drop quite sharply right after the policy is implemented, 
which occurs in several different calendar years across regions.  
As explained in the previous section, although we include fixed effects for regions, years and 
trimesters, there could also be region specific trends that could be interfering in our identification 
strategy. Thus, in order to control for these regional trends and be able to credibly isolate the 
effects of the reduction in bar closing times, in Table 5 we also include in the regressions linear 
region-specific trends. Although it has been argued that these trends can partially be capturing 
the impacts of the policy of interest, we believe it is important to include them in our setting as 
the heterogeneity across regions in Spain is very high.  Consequently, the risk of having different 
trends in working accidents across regions in our setting is non-negligible. For this reason, the 
rest of the results will include region-specific trends. As it can be seen in Panel A of Table 5 all 
the results show the similar sign but smaller magnitudes. However, only the coefficient for the 
construction sector is significant. Not only the coefficient is significant but the size of the effect 
for this sector of the economy is really big: we estimate that the reduction in bar closing hours 
decreased working accidents in 6.60 accidents per 100.000 workers, which implies a reduction 
by 18.3%. We believe that these results are consistent with the profile of workers employed in 
the construction sector in Spain which are mainly young, low educated men that have higher 
probabilities of drinking and going out at nights than other population groups.
7
 As before, Panel 
                                               
7 Before the onset of the recent economic crisis, 93.2% of the workers employed in the construction sector were men 
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B confirms that trends in working accidents are stable right before the policy is implemented 
which confirms that there is no evidence of endogeneity in the timing of the policy. 
There are many channels through which limiting the number of opening hours for bars can result 
in reductions in workplace accidents; individuals may stop drinking alcohol which will improve 
concentration the next day at work or, even if they drink the same amount, they may go to sleep 
earlier and be more rested so as to avoid having an accident the next day. Another argument can 
be that, even if the amount of alcohol or the number of hours of sleep do not change, if individu-
als stay at home instead of being in bars, they may also be more rested and avoid working acci-
dents the next day. Additionally, even non-bar users may be less disturbed by noise at nights and 
be in better shape to work and to avoid a workplace accident. Therefore, it is not feasible for us 
to identify all the channels potentially operating and in this paper we focus on the effects of the 
reform on one other outcome (and potentially mediator) which is alcohol consumption. In order 
to do that, we use three proxies for alcohol consumption: our main proxy variable is yearly ex-
penditure in bars per household. Apart from that, we also consider two additional proxies for 
alcohol consumption: self-reported alcohol consumption and hospitalizations caused by exces-
sive alcohol consumption.  
The results for yearly expenditure per household are presented in Table 6 which includes the re-
gressions for several types of expenditures. The data comes from the Spanish Family Expendi-
ture Survey. In the first column the dependent variable is the amount of euros (in ln) spent in bars 
while the rest of columns include the results for expenditures in durable goods, which we will 
use as placebo tests. These include expenditure in furniture, textiles, big home appliances, small 
home appliances, crockery and other durable goods. In principle, the reduction in bar opening 
hours should reduce the money spent in bars but should not affect the amount of household re-
sources spend in these other durable goods. As it can be seen in the first column of Table 6, ex-
penditure in bars was reduced by 13% as a result of the advancement in bar closing hours. As 
expected, none of the coefficients capturing the effects of the reform on other durable goods is 
significant, which reinforces the validity of our estimates and approach, and provides evidence 
that our results are not driven by other economic or social trends at the regional level at the same 
time than the introduction of our policy of interest. 
                                                                                                                                                       
and 84% of them had less than 50 years old (60% had less than 40 years old). Furthermore, around 25% of them had 
primary education or below, 60% of them had secundary education and only 15% of them had college education. 
Data taken from the Spanish Labour Force Survey for the first trimester of 2008. 
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We next focus on the results on self-assessed alcohol consumption using data from the Spanish 
National Health Survey. We use as outcomes dummy variables that capture the consumption of 
alcoholic drinks and tobacco. In line with the results found with the data on expenditure in bars, 
we can see in Table 7 that all the diff-diff coefficients are negative pointing towards a reduction 
in self-reported alcohol consumption. Furthermore, the coefficients for daily and weekly con-
sumption of wine are significant and the effects are stronger for men. This is consistent with the 
strongest reduction in workplace accidents found for men and the construction sector, which is a 
sector with a majority of male workers (93,2% of workers in the construction sector in Spain are 
men; Labour Force Survey, first trimester of 2008). 
The regressions for the consumption of whisky, liquor, aperitifs and mixed drinks as well as the 
probability of smoking are also negative but non-significant. These results have to be interpreted 
with caution as the National Health Survey is not implemented every year. This fact complicates 
the precise identification of the effects of the reform as, for some of the regions we do not have 
information in the first or second year of the reform. Thus, the results obtained with this database 
should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true effects of the policy. Furthermore, the effects 
of some of the strongest drinks are also difficult to identify with survey data due to the low inci-
dence of its consumption. Even if taking into account the limitations of this dataset, we still iden-
tify significant reductions in the consumption of some of the alcoholic drinks considered. 
Finally, we focus on an extreme proxy of alcohol consumption which is the hospitalization rate 
caused by alcohol consumption. We interpret this variable as an extreme outcome of alcohol con-
sumption as it represents episodes of strong alcohol poisoning problems which require a hospi-
talization to be treated.
8
  We can see in Table 8 that all the coefficients of the diff-diff variable are 
negative but not significant and that the strongest reduction in alcohol-related hospitalizations is 
reported again for men. Considering the fact that individuals are more likely to experience the 
alcohol-related hospitalization episodes during the weekends, we restrict our data to alcohol-
related hospitalizations that occur only on Saturdays and Sundays to try to improve the precision 
of our estimates. Results are presented in Table 9 and we can observe that they are consistent 
with Table 8 when we considered hospitalizations occurring during any of the days of the week: 
all coefficients are negative and stronger in size for men. In fact, in this specification considering 
                                               
8 The following diagnostics are included: Mental health disorder and dependency syndrome caused by alcohol 
consumption, liver diseases caused by alcohol consumption and alcohol poisoning. 
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only weekend hospitalizations we do find a significant negative coefficient for men pointing to-
wards important reductions in alcohol-related hospitalizations during the weekends as a result of 
the reduction in bar opening hours. More precisely, the reduction in hospitalizations for men is 




As before, we find that the policy reduced alcohol consumption particularly for men, which is 
the same group that showed significant reductions in self-reported alcohol consumption as well 
as in workplace accidents (in the construction sector which is predominantly dominated by men; 





In this paper we provide the first causal estimate on the effects of a policy that reduced bar 
opening hours on workplace accidents and we find that the policy causally decreased working 
accidents. Thus, we expand on previous literature that focused on the impact of similar policies 
on different outcomes (such as fatal traffic accidents (Lovenheim et al. 2011), crime rates 
(Heaton 2012) or workplace absenteeism (Green et al. 2015), among others) by looking at a 
previously unexplored but rather relevant outcome; working accidents. Accidents at work stand 
as an important determinant of future health and disability rates and represent an estimated 
economic cost between 1.8% and 6% of the country’s GDP. Thus, it has much deeper economic 
and social impact than absenteeism or crime rates.  
In order to identify the effects we exploit the staggered implementation of the reduction in bar 
opening hours across Spanish regions over time that occurred between 1990 and 2011. Before 
the reforms, bars were allowed to remain open until 6am while the reform restricted opening 
times until 2-3.30am, depending on the region. 
Furthermore, we also provide evidence that the reduction in bar closing times fostered a 
reduction in the consumption of alcohol. We use several measures to capture alcohol 
consumption patterns: household expenditures in bars, self-assessed alcohol consumption and 
                                               
9 We have run alternative specifications for smaller diagnoses groups of alcohol-related hospitalizations and all the 




hospitalizations due to excessive alcohol consumption.  
We use both survey data on household’s expenditures and self-assessed alcohol consumption as 
well as rich administrative databases from the Social Security administration for both working 
accidents as well as hospitalizations which allows us to include the universe of individuals that 
suffer from a work accident or a hospitalization episode.   
We believe that our results are important from a policy perspective because they show the 
existence of positive health and labor market spillover effects of reducing bar closing hours and, 
thus, they provide valuable guidance for policy makers considering the introduction of these 
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Ley 13/1999, de 15 de diciembre, de Espectáculos Públicos y 
Actividades Recreativas de Andalucía (BOE núm. 15, de 18 de 
enero), modificada por la Ley 10/2002, de 21 de diciembre (BOE 






Ley 11/2005, de 28 de diciembre, reguladora de los espectáculos 
públicos, actividades recreativas y establecimientos públicos de la 







Ley 1/1998, de 8 de enero, de Régimen Jurídico de los 
Espectáculos Públicos y Actividades Clasificadas (BOE núm. 27, 
de 31 de enero). Corrección de errores en BOE núm. 68, de 20-03-
98 y modificada por la Ley 2/2002, de 27 de marzo (BOE núm. 






Decreto 72/1997, de 7 julio. Establece el régimen general de 
horarios de establecimientos y espectáculos públicos y actividades 








Ley 17/1997, de 4 de julio, de Espectáculos Públicos y 
Actividades Recreativas (BOE núm. 98, de 24 de abril de 1998), 
modificada por la Ley 24/1999, de 27 de diciembre (BOE núm. 
48, de 25 de febrero de 2000), por la Ley 5/2000, de 8 de mayo 
(BOE núm. 126, de 26 de mayo) y por la Ley 5/2002, de 27 de 






Ley 7/2006, de 2 de octubre, de espectáculos públicos y 
actividades recreativas de la Comunidad de Castilla y León (BOE 







Orden de 4 de enero de 1996, que regula el horario general de los 







Orden INT/358/2011, de 19 de diciembre, por la que se regulan 
los horarios de los establecimientos abiertos al público, de los 
espectáculos públicos y de las actividades recreativas sometidos a 
la Ley 11/2009, de 6 de julio, de regulación administrativa de los 






Orden de 16 septiembre 1996. Espectáculos públicos y actividades 
recreativas. Horarios de apertura y cierre de los establecimientos. 
Consejería presidencia y trabajo. D.O. Extremadura 19 septiembre 







Orden de 16 de junio de 2005 por la que se determinan los 
horarios de apertura y cierre de espectáculos y establecimientos 






Circular No 2/1994, sobre horario de cierre para los 
establecimientos públicos, espectáculos y fiestas para la 
comunidad autónnoma de la región de Murciao. (B.O.E. 15-3-
2:30am or 
3:30am**** 
                                               
10 Table extracted from Green et al. (2015). We have slightly modified the original table by including some regions 








Ley Foral 2/1989, de 13 de marzo, Reguladora de los 
Espectáculos Públicos y Actividades Recreativas (BOE núm. 84, 
de 8 de abril), modificada por la Ley Foral 26/2001, de 10 de 
diciembre (BOE núm. 39, de 14 de febrero de 2002). 27 de 
octubre de 2003, 656/2003 Decreto Foral (BON145 de 







Ley de las Cortes Valencianas 4/2003, de 26 de febrero, de los 
Espectáculos Públicos, Actividades Recreativas y 
Establecimientos Públicos (BOE núm. 81, de 4 de abril). Ley 
4/2003, de 26 de febrero, Orden de 19 de diciembre de 2003, 







Ley 7/1999, de 8 de abril, de Atribución de Competencias a los 
Consejos Insulares de Menorca y de Eivissa WE Formentera en 
materia de Espectáculos Públicos y Actividades Recreativas (BOE 






Ley 4/2000, de 25 de octubre, de Espectáculos Públicos y 






Ley 4/1995, de 10 de noviembre, de la Comunidad Autónoma del 
País Vasco, sobre normas reguladoras de Espectáculos Públicos y 
Actividades Recreativas (BOE núm. 230, de 1 de diciembre). 






Ley 8/2002, de 21 de octubre, de Espectáculos Públicos y 
Actividades Recreativas. (BOE núm. 278, de 20 de noviembre). 
Decreto 90/2004, de 11 de noviembre, por el que se regula el 
regimen de horarios de los establecimientos, locales e 
instalaciones para espectáculos públicos y actividades recreativas 
en el Principado de Asturias. 
3:30am* 
Notes: * On Fridays and Saturdays bars are allowed to stay open for one hour more. ** On Fridays and Saturdays bars are 
allowed to stay open for half an hour more. *** On Fridays, Saturdays and the night before a holidays are allowed to stay open 
for half an hour more **** The first one corresponds to the winter opening times, the second one to the summer opening times.  













Table 2. Political party in the regional government at the time that the policy was 
implemented. 
 
Region Year of Policy Implementation Political Party Year of  the Policy Implementation 
Andalucía 1st quarter 2003 PSOE (left) 
Aragon 1st quarter 2006 PSOE (left) 
Asturias 1st quarter 2005 PSOE (left) 
Balearic Islands 2nd quarter 1999 PSOE (left) 
Canary Islands 2nd quarter 2002 CC (right) 
Cantabria 3th quarter 1997 PP (right) 
Castile Leon 4th quarter 2006 PP (right) 
Castile La Mancha 4st quarter 1996 PSOE (left) 
Catalonia 4th quarter 2011 CIU (right) 
Valencia 1st quarter  2004 PP (right) 
Extremadura 1st quarter  1996 PSOE (left) 
Galicia 2nd quarter 2005 PSOE (left) 
Madrid 3th quarter 2002 PP (right) 
Murcia 1st quarter  1994 PSOE (left) 
Navarra 2nd quarter 2004 UPN (right) 
Bask Country 3th quarter 1998 EAJ-PNV (right) 
La Rioja 4th quarter 1998 PP (right) 
Source: Own elaboration by the authors. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics. Workplace accidents, hospitalizations caused by excessive 
alcohol consumption, self-reported consumption of alcohol (survey data). 
 
 Total  Man  Woman Services Construction  Industry 
Workplace accidents for every 100.000 employed individuals 
Mean  22.70 7.68 31.02 27.94 35.08 16.63 
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 
       
Annual Spending per Household (in euros) 
Bars       
Mean  148.50 - - - - - 
Observations 119 - - - - - 
       
Textiles       
Mean  185.65 - - - - - 
Observations 119 - - - - - 
       
Big House Appliances 
Mean  34.74 - - - - - 
Observations 119 - - - - - 
       
Small House Appliances 
Mean  184.15 - - - - - 
Observations 119 - - - - - 
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Crockery        
Mean  31.63 - - - - - 
Observations 119 - - - - - 
       
Others       
Mean  153.53 - - - - - 
Observations 119 - - - - - 
       
Self-reported alcohol consumption (dummy variable) 
Daily Wine Consumption 
Mean  0.11 0.07 0.16 - - - 
Observations 78,570 43,300 35,269 - - - 
       
Weekly Wine Consumption 
Mean  0.17 0.12 0.23 - - - 
Observations 78,570 43,300 35,269 - - - 
       
Monthly Wine Consumption 
Mean  0.20 0.15 0.26 - - - 
Observations 78,570 43,300 35,269 - - - 
       
Weekly Whisky Consumption 
Mean  0.02 0.01 0.03 - - - 
Observations 78,570 43,300 35,269 - - - 
       
Monthly Whisky Consumption 
Mean  0.03 0.01 0.05 - - - 
Observations 78,570 43,300 35,269 - - - 
       
Daily smoker 
Mean  0.27 0.21 0.35 - - - 
Observations 78,570 43,300 35,269 - - - 
       
Hospitalizations caused by excessive alcohol consumption for every 100.000 individuals 
All Weekdays 
Mean  23.67 14.43 31.00 - - - 
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 - - - 
       
Weekends 
Mean  1.48 0.96 1.88 - - - 
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 - - - 
       
 
Source: Register data from the Spanish Social Security administration for the years 1990-2011. Spanish Family Expenditure 
Survey (EPF) for the years 1998 to 2004. Spanish National Health Survey (ENS) for the years 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2004, 





Figure 2.  Percentage of workplace accidents per 100.000 workers. Three years before and 
three years after the implementation of the policy. 
 
Notes: As the reduction in bar closing hours was introduced in several different calendar years across regions, we centre the year 
of policy implementation to 0 so that it is the same for all regions. Then, we plot the mean of workplace accidents per 100.000 
employed individuals up to 3 years before and three years after the implementation of the reduction in bar closing hours in all 
regions in order to explore the trends in the outcome variable before and after the implementation of the policy.  








Figure 3.  Average Annual Expenditure in Bars per Household (in Euros). Three years 
before and three years after the implementation of the policy. 
 
 
Notes: As the reduction in bar closing hours was introduced in several different calendar years across regions, we centre the year 
of policy implementation to 0 so that it is the same for all regions. Then, we plot the average annual expenditure in bars per 
households for up to 3 years before and three years after the implementation of the reduction in bar closing hours in all regions in 
order to explore the trends in the outcome variable before and after the implementation of the policy.  







Table 4. Workplace accidents for every 100.000 employed individuals (without Region 
Specific Time Trends). 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-Difference       
 Total  Woman Man  Industry Construction  Services 
Treat -2.62** -1.49* -2.89** -3.01 -4.61 -2.43** 
 (1.223) (0.779) (1.277) (3.605) (2.868) (0.965) 
       
Panel B: Event Study Design     
Pre3 0.77 0.40 1.13 0.21 1.98 0.47 
 (0.916) (0.472) (1.351) (14.016) (3.435) (0.545) 
Pre2 1.40 0.47 2.16* 1.41 4.68 0.28 
 (0.930) (0.582) (1.235) (1.958) (3.684) (0.604) 
Pre1 0.41 0.45 0.68 -1.15 1.51 0.41 
 (1.147) (0.536) (1.504) (2.170) (5.707) (0.746) 
Treat -2.14 -1.22 -2.12 -2.97 -2.94 -2.20 
 (1.343) (0.888) (1.348) (5.197) (3.375) (1.413) 
       
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trim FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region Specific Time Trend NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Mean Pre-Policy 28.03 9.62 37.60 31.39 35.92 21.75 
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Notes: In panel A the dependent variable is the percentage of workplace accidents every 100.000 employed individuals at the 
regional and trimester-year level. The regressions control for the unemployment rate at the local level in each period as well as 
for time and region fixed effects. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods and regions for which the reduction in bar 
closing hours is implemented and 0 otherwise and it captures the impact of the policy. Panel B is an event study model similar to 
Panel A but additionally including dummy variables for 1, 2 or 3 years before the implementation of the policy. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the regional level in parenthesis and the p-value of the wild bootstrap with 500 replications in brackets.  
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 





Table 5. Workplace accidents for every 100.000 employed individuals (with Region Specific 
Time Trend). 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-Difference       
 Total  Woman Man  Industry Construction  Services 
Treat -1.74 -1.06 -1.96 -0.56 -6.60** -1.60 
 (1.378) (0.661) (1.656) (2.531) (2.922) (1.206) 
       
Panel B: Event Study Design     
Pre3 0.73 0.34 1.11 2.01** -0.16 0.68 
 (0.915) (0.512) (1.106) (0.935) (0.908) (0.705) 
Pre2 1.48 0.48 2.28 3.53** 2.16 0.64 
 (1.188) (0.748) (1.577) (1.645) (3.776) (1.272) 
Pre1 0.63 0.52 0.95 1.49 -1.38 0.91 
 (0.932) (0.715) (1.085) (1.836) (2.842) (1.236) 
Treat -0.92 -0.65 -0.72 1.40 -6.56 -0.92 
 (1.934) (0.987) (2.855) (2.404) (4.307) (1.919) 
       
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trim FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region Specific Time Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean Pre-Policy 28.03 9.62 37.60 31.39 35.92 21.75 
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Notes: In panel A the dependent variable is the percentage of workplace accidents every 100.000 employed individuals at the 
regional and trimester-year level. The regressions control for the unemployment rate at the local level in each period, for time and 
region fixed effects as well as for region-specific linear trends. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods and regions 
for which the reduction in bar closing hours is implemented and 0 otherwise and it captures the impact of the policy. Panel B is 
an event study model similar to Panel A but additionally including dummy variables for 1, 2 or 3 years before the implementation 
of the policy. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parenthesis and the p-value of the wild bootstrap with 500 
replications in brackets.  
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 





Table 6. Annual Spending in Bars and Durable Goods per Household (in ln(Euros)). 
 
        
 Bars Furniture Textiles Big Home  
Appliances 
Small Home  
Appliances 
Crockery Others 
Treat -0.13** -0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.10 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.060) (0.130) (0.066) (0.177) (0.135) (0.129) (0.104) 
        
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trim FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region Time 
Trend 





183.31 216.22 237.80 182.87 76.01 173.66 810.78 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes: The dependent variables are the yearly average household spending per region in bars, furniture, textiles, big and small 
home appliances, crockery and other expenditure types. The regressions control for the unemployment rate at the local level in 
each period, for time and region fixed effects as well as for region-specific linear trends. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
the periods and regions for which the reduction in bar closing hours is implemented and 0 otherwise and it captures the impact of 
the policy. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parenthesis and the p-value of the wild bootstrap with 500 
replications in brackets.  
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 








Table 7. Effects of the policy on self-reported alcohol consumption. 
 
 Total Woman Man 
Daily Wine Consumption    
Treat -0.02 -0.01 -0.04* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) 
Weekly Wine Consumption    
Treat -0.02 -0.01 -0.04** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) 
Monthly Wine Consumption 
Treat -0.01 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.022) 
Weekly Whisky Consumption  
Treat 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) 
Monthly Whisky Consumption  
Treat -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.051) 
Daily smoker    
Treat -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Trim FE YES YES YES 
Region Specific Time Trend YES YES YES 
Observations 78,570 43,300 35,269 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes: The dependent variables are dummy variables for daily, weekly and monthly consumption of wine, whisky and tobacco. 
The regressions control for the unemployment rate at the local level in each period, for time and region fixed effects as well as for 
region-specific linear trends. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods and regions for which the reduction in bar 
closing hours is implemented and 0 otherwise and it captures the impact of the policy. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
regional level in parenthesis and the p-value of the wild bootstrap with 500 replications in brackets.  
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 




Table 8. Hospitalizations caused by excessive alcohol consumption for every 100.000 indi-
viduals. 
 
Difference-in-Difference    
 Total Woman Man 
    
Treat -3.00 -2.72 -3.36 
 (2.031) (1.816) (2.307) 
    
Region FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Trim FE YES YES YES 
Region Specific Time Trend YES YES YES 
Mean Pre-Policy 18.64 10.65 23.29 
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of hospitalizations caused by alcohol consumption for every 100.000 individuals in 
each region and trimester-year. The regressions control for the unemployment rate at the local level in each period, for time and 
region fixed effects as well as for region-specific linear trends. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods and regions 
for which the reduction in bar closing hours is implemented and 0 otherwise and it captures the impact of the policy. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the regional level in parenthesis and the p-value of the wild bootstrap with 500 replications in brack-
ets.  
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Register data from the the Hospital Morbidity Survey for the years 1990-2011. 
 
Table 9. Hospitalizations caused by excessive alcohol consumption for every 100.000 
individuals. Sample including only weekend hospitalizations. 
 
Difference-in-Difference    
 Total Woman Man 
    
Treat -0.19 -0.12 -0.28** 
 (0.117) (0.105) (0.135) 
    
Region FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Trim FE YES YES YES 
Region Specific Time Trend YES YES YES 
Mean Pre-Policy 1.40 0.86 1.70 
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of hospitalizations caused by alcohol consumption for every 100.000 individuals in 
each region and trimester-year. The sample is restricted to include only hospitalizations during the weekend. The regressions 
control for the unemployment rate at the local level in each period, for time and region fixed effects as well as for region-specific 
linear trends. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periods and regions for which the reduction in bar closing hours is 
implemented and 0 otherwise and it captures the impact of the policy. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in 
parenthesis and the p-value of the wild bootstrap with 500 replications in brackets.  
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Register data from the the Hospital Morbidity Survey for the years 1990-2011. 
 
 
